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PREFACE 
This execut ive  review descr ibes  in brief t h e  Interna-  
tional Conference on Transportat ion,  Storage,  and 
Disposal of Hazardous Materials, held a t  t h e  Interna-  
tional Ins t i tu te  f o r  Applied Sys  tems Analysis (EEASA), 
and t h e  ensuing Proceedings, I n s u r i n g  a n d  Managing 
Hazardous  R i sks .  The Conference brought  together  
representa t ives  of academia, business, and  government 
from Eas t  and West t o  discuss t h e  na tu re  of c u r r e n t  
problems in t h e  a r e a  of hazardous materials. An impor- 
t a n t  objective of t h e  Conference was t o  suggest steps 
t h a t  could b e  under taken b y  industrial firms, t h e  
insurance indus t ry ,  and government agencies t o  
improve t h e  sa fe ty  a n d  efficiency with which hazardous 
materials are produced and controlled in industrialized 
societies.  
Conference sponsors  were  t h e  Internat ional  Insti- 
t u t e  f o r  Applied Systems Analysis (EIASA), The  Geneva 
Association, and  t h e  Cen te r  f o r  Risk and  Decision 
Processes of t h e  University of Pennsylvania. Additional 
financial suppor t  was received from t h e  US Environ- 
mental Protect ion Agency, t h e  Monsan t o  Corporation, 
t h e  Rohn and Haas Corporation, t h e  Cen te r  f o r  Organi- 
zational Innovation and  t h e  Reginald Jones Cen te r  a t  
t h e  University of Pennsylvania, and t h e  Canadian 
Committee for IIASA. We a r e  grateful t o  all of these 
institutions for their  generous support of t h e  Confer- 
ence. 
Within IIASA, a long history of research in risk 
activities is evident. This owes much t o  t he  vision of 
IIASA's founding Director, Howard Raiffa, and to  Pro- 
gram Leaders who have promoted risk research a t  
IIASA. The Conference continued this tradition with 
t h e  strong support of IIASA's Director Thomas H. Lee 
and Deputy Director Vitali Kaf tanov. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite having advanced three decades into the age of 
nuclear power, we still face the problem of the disposal 
of hazardous wastes. Hazardous materials are used to 
produce goods and services that people desire, so 
there is no question of doing without them. 
But using them has led to industrial accidents, 
sometimes spectacular disasters: leakage of methyl iso- 
cyanate from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, 
killed 2500 people, caused eye injuries to 34000 others, 
and caused 200000 people to leave the area when the 
plant was recommissioned. Natural gas explosions at a 
Pemex plant in Mexico killed 452 people, left 31000 
homeless, and forced the evacuation of 300 000 others. 
In Mississauga, Canada, 220000 people were evacuated 
when a trainload of chlorine was derailed. An estimated 
15 000 people died when the Marvi-Macchu dam, in India, 
gave way. The cost of decontaminating a hazardous- 
waste dump in Colorado has exceeded $500 million, and 
another dump in Times Beach, MO, has cost $235 million. 
A t  Seveso, Italy, 250 000 m3 of contaminated soil had to 
be buried, rendering many acres of land unusable and 
forcing people from their homes. One lesson we have 
learned from these disasters is that we cannot antici- 
pate what form the next catastrophe will take in terms 
of death, dislocation, and financial equity. 
W e  have witnessed t h e  r i se  of environmental con- 
ce rns  during t h e  past  15 years .  So t h e  public, under- 
s tandably,  insists on protection of i ts  heal th and safe ty  
and wants t o  be  handsomely compensated in case  of 
accidents .  In many cases t h e  cour ts  have agreed,  with 
t h e  word accident often being redefined - from a sud- 
den calamity with a specific origin t o  an  emergent prob- 
lem t h e  cause of which cannot b e  located in time o r  
a t t r ibu ted  t o  one source. 
For insurers ,  t h e  result  is massive uncertainty:  
What a r e  t h e y  liable for? How have t h e y  assumed r isks 
t h a t  may not have been conceived when t h e  underwrit- 
ing occurred?  How can t h e y  determine t h e i r  premiums 
fo r  t h e  fu ture  if r i sk  levels can be  established only 
inferentially from limited historical samples? How can 
t h e y  calculate t h e i r  exposure if pas t  exper ience  is no 
longer a reliable guide and if t h e  legal rules a r e  
changed in t h e  middle of t h e  game? How can they  k e e p  
losses from attaining staggering sums? 
Manufacturers have t h e i r  problems as  well. If 
insurance is too expensive, t h e y  may be  forced t o  r isk 
operat ing with liniltsd o r  no coverage, in which case  
victims of accidents  may receive only limited compensa- 
tion fo r  injuries and losses. Some firms might b e  forced 
out of business for  environmental reasons, but  actually 
b e  essential  fo r  economic, social, o r  o t h e r  reasons. 
Firms may have incentives t o  invest in safe ty  and 
t h e r e b y  reduce  t h e i r  liability - but how can t h e y  
determine t h e  optimal level of protect ion? 
Despite t h e s e  problems, which a r i se  from many 
perspectives , t h e r e  a r e  risk-management tools - 
insurance, compensation, and regulation - t h a t  
together  may help us deal with hazardous wastes and 
t h e i r  consequences. These tools must b e  used not a s  
"quick fixes", however, but  a s  elements in a system, 
including t h e  production process where waste is gen- 
e r a t e d ,  t h e  means by which i t  is t ranspor ted ,  and t h e  
means b y  which i t  is disposed of o r  s to red .  The 
in teres ted  par t ies  - manufacturers,  insurers ,  govern- 
ment agencies, t h e  general public, a s  well a s  potential 
victims of accidents  - a r e  not isolated from each o the r .  
The concern of this Conference focused on t h e  
role of t h e  risk-management tools of insurance,  compen- 
sation, and regulation in those p a r t s  of t h e  process 
where t h e y  can b e  used imaginatively t o  marlage hazard- 
ous materials from cradle t o  grave. The following 
synopsis serves  as an introduction t o  t h e  Conference 
Proceedings, I n s u r i n g  a n d  Manag ing  Hazardous  
R i s k s .  
PURCHASING THE PROCEEDINGS 
The book I n s u r i n g  a n d  Manag ing  Hazardous  Risks:  
From Seveso  t o  Bhopal  a n d  Beyond will b e  published 
by Springer-Verlag in t h e  ear ly  fall of 1986. Copies of 
t h e  book will b e  available through your local bookseller* 
o r  d i rec t ly  from Spr-inger-Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17 ,  
D-6900 Heidelberg 1, FRG o r  Spr.inger-Verlag, N e w  
York, Inc.,  175 Fifth Avenue, N e w  York, NY 10010, USA.  
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THE INSURANCE DILEMMA 
WHY INSURANCE? 
Although insurance can never subst i tu te  f o r  preventive 
measures t o  p ro tec t  people and t h e  environment, i t  can 
soften t h e  economic impact of random harmful events. 
Whatever measures are taken,  r i sk  is always present .  
Risk is defined in terms of an event  whose occurrence  
is of definite duration and beyond t h e  control of any 
p a r t y  - an "accident". I t  applies t o  a known number of 
victims . 
The point of obtaining insurance is t o  transform 
unsure financial burdens from unforeseen events into 
well-defined and limited costs  within a known period of 
time, s o  t h a t  t h e  insured par t ies  can eliminate o r  
reduce  t h e  imponderables on the i r  books. Insurers 
des i re  t o  reduce  t h e i r  imponderables as well, s o  t h e y  
must b e  able  t o  assess fu ture  losses and sp read  t h e  
r isks as  widely as possible. The language of t h e  policies 
must b e  exac t ,  t h e  terms precise.  
UNCERTAINTIES INTRODUCED BY 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
Hazardous materials have changed t h e  notion of 
"accident ". Claims a r e  currently made on policies writ- 
ten as  long as  50 years ago and a r e  filled by people who 
may have been located f a r  from t h e  area  of t he  
incident. Insurers can no longer always define t h e  
event tha t  triggers t h e  claims o r  easily t race  t h e  
course from t h e  polluter t o  t h e  injury. Losses can 
reach catastrophic proportions and a r e  often not lim- 
i ted to  actual damage. They may apply t o  a wide range 
of consequences, from t h e  loss of use of contaminated 
plants t o  environmental impacts, such a s  foul odors. 
New technology may produce previously unsuspected 
toxic effects; materials tha t  a r e  safe  individually may 
be  toxic when taken in combination. Sometimes risks 
a r e  revealed that  could not have been conceived when 
t h e  underwriting occurred. 
There a r e  o ther  uncertainties as  well: high puni- 
tive damages and cleanup expenses (which insurers 
formerly covered in order  t o  prevent o r  minimize liabil- 
i ty  claims). All in all, insurers a r e  attempting t o  make 
sound calculations of premiums in unaccustomed, uncer- 
tain circumstances . 
LIABILITIES OF THE LIABILITY SYSTEM 
Legal decisions have changed t h e  rules tha t  determine 
who is liable t o  whom under what circumstances, so  tha t  
new legal rules favor injured claimants. (The US, where 
reliance on liability insurance is greater ,  has been 
affected more than Europe, where t he re  is comprehen- 
sive national health insurance.) The rules have changed 
because of previous widespread dissatisfaction with t h e  
liability system, a system tha t  is not fully t o  blame 
since i t  was not designed to  deal with all of t h e  issues 
raised by hazardous materials. 
Legislators may determine t h e  limits, if any, of lia- 
bility, but insurers cannot provide unlimited coverage 
for  high-exposure risks. They must be  able t o  calculate 
their  exposure before t he  fact. For instance, there  
a r e  no reserves to cover t h e  extensive costs of 
cleaning-up sites, since this was not a risk considered 
when many of t he  earlier policies were written; present 
policyholders will have to  make up t h e  loss. 
Liability insurance will not become obsolete: it will 
merely be relegated to  areas where causation and blarne 
can be conventionally fixed. Even though insurers 
presumably could protect  themselves by increasing 
premiums and limiting coverage, they have taken steps 
t o  reverse t h e  trends toward expanded liability. They 
a re  concerned that  t he  courts will expand coverage 
retroactively. Injured people still have the  right t o  sue 
under tor t  law, a procedure that  is encouraged since 
compensation through special funds is limited. 
In response, American insurers have changed to  
"claims-made" coverage, under which claims can be 
brought only as long as t h e  coverage is in force. 
Claims-made policies a r e  necessary until losses can be 
reliably projected. To be an effective solution, they 
depend on a common understanding between insurers 
and insured parties, both of whom must honor each 
other 's  interests. Such policies can also be abused: 
insurers may cancel policies arbitrarily and insured 
parties may t r y  t o  precipitate claims (and t h e  courts 
will tend to  favor them). Licensing and other  regula- 
tory controls become, in effect ,  nonenforceable if poli- 
cies must be renewed for many years af ter  t he  indus- 
trial activity they cover has ended. 
CONTRIBUTORY ISSUES 
Insurers cannot easily mobilize their  capacity for cov- 
erage because they a re  a diverse, independent group. 
This t ra i t  fosters competition among them - indeed, t h e  
insurance market swings bet  ween periods of plentiful 
and inexpensive coverage to  periods of restrictive poli- 
cies with high premiums. Competition also makes insur- 
e r s  more than reluctant to  pool their  resources or  
adopt a uniform approach to  underwriting. Yet they 
have joined into pools to  provide coverage for nuclear 
power, since governments have required insurance for 
nuclear liability and have provided limited backup 
guarantees. These lessons might be applied to  environ- 
mental risks. 
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY 
If t he  insurance industry does not respond to  a need 
for coverage, then mutual insurance organizations may 
spring up, o r  t he  government may have to  intervene. 
Insurers must define their  terms with clarity, 
especially regarding what is and is not covered - for 
instance, explicitly canceling coverage if t he  insured 
violates applicable laws o r  regulations designed to  pro- 
tect t h e  environment. Even in cases of clearly written 
clauses, however, t he  courts have tended to  favor t he  
insured; Congress has indicated tha t  i t  will help insur- 
e r s  establish rules governing the  interpretation of 
words o r  clauses. 
Insurers must be able t o  revise the i r  premiums in 
response to  new developments in technology, science, 
medicine, economy, o r  law. Underwriters must strive 
for a point of "determinateness" - when they  can close 
their  books and reevaluate their  policies and correct ,  
if necessary, their  underwriting practices. Insurers 
will also have to  reexamine the  "polluter pays" princi- 
ple and t h e  "cradle-to-grave" rules of liability. 
To increase the  scope of available coverage, t he  
principles of all-ris k , firs t-party insurance must pre- 
vail. The costs of pollution could be allocated according 
to  t he  evidence of causation - tha t  is, collectively and 
not individually. All injured parties would be compen- 
sated fully and the  cost of t he  benefits would be 
assigned t o  the  polluters as a group. This plan might 
avoid t h e  problems of unclear o r  multiple causation. 
THE OUTLOOK 
Insurance coverage for hazardous materials will have its 
price, but i t  will not provide long-term security. 
Rather,  t h e  insured amounts will be  fairly modest, com- 
pared with t h e  potential of some catastrophes. Insur- 
e r s  will provide coverage only for  claims made within a 
specified period and will not cover t h e  cost of cleanup 
of t h e  insured's own premises. Policies will exclude 
specific substances by name (for instance, asbestos) o r  
specific types of damage (for example, genetic). Insur- 
e r s  will be  selective and avoid high-risk facilities. 
For long-term risk, coverage should utilize tech- 
niques borrowed from life insurance. I ts  continuity 
must be  assured, perhaps with such sweeteners as sav- 
ings on premiums when claims a r e  lower than expected.  
Political factors may also inhibit new directions, so  
alternative systems of insurance may be  difficult t o  
develop. The role of private insurers depends on the i r  
willingness t o  meet t he  demand and cooperate with 
government in developing a satisfactory system. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL- 
IMPAIRMENT LIABILITY (EIL) 
Despite billion-dollar claims for  environmental catas- 
trophes,  aggregate losses from these  disasters a r e  low, 
even negligible, compared to, say, losses from all fires. 
Why, then,  do insurers make a fuss about EIL? 
Several reasons account for  the i r  concern. Only a 
f e w  policies a r e  issued, so tha t  t h e  premiums collected 
a r e  small relative t o  t he  possible catastrophic losses. 
In addition, familiar events, such as  f ires,  a r e  not 
viewed by t h e  public as threatening to  i t s  health, but 
t h e  smallest pollution case is viewed with high emotions, 
which quickly can turn t h e  problem into a political 
issue. Other part ies,  from lawyers t o  cleanup contrac- 
tors,  see t h e  EIL insurer as  a "deep pocket" tha t  can 
be picked endlessly. 
EIL, which began in 1974, today issues claims-made 
policies. Although insurance ra tes  normally depend on 
t h e  size and frequency of claims, too little is known 
about t h e  conditions covered by EIL for  this insurance 
t o  rely on past  history. A more subjective approach is 
thus used. Processes and substances a r e  listed 
according to  their  chance of causing harm (without con- 
sidering whether a claim might arise o r  t he  extent  of 
such a claim). Among: other  elements considered a r e  
t h e  country involved, its history and degree of techni- 
cal development, t he  claims-consciousness of its people, 
t h e  legal system, and t h e  stability of t h e  prospective 
client's company. 
The client's premises a r e  inspected to  assess t h e  
possibility of actionable claims. Hazards a r e  identified 
and then quantified according to  several models (for 
instance, emission of toxic substances o r  heat radiation 
o r  vapor-cloud explosion). Plant managers a r e  urged to  
eliminate o r  reduce as many risks as possible. Despite 
these preventive actions, corporations arc? concerned 
that  their  insurance is adequate to  cover a cata- 
strophic loss. Today, EIL has practically dried up in 
t h e  US and the  premiums have skyrocketed for the  lim- 
ited coverage that  a firm may possibly be able t o  pur- 
chase. 
Several participants a t  t h e  conference pointed 
out that  EIL coverage available worldwide has been 
drastically reduced since 1983; currently,  individual 
coverage limits for a single firm a re  of t h e  order  of 
$10-20 million - hardly adequate for t he  risks involved. 
The US has been particularly hard-hit because of a lack 
of reinsurance, a reflection by reinsurers of their  view 
of t he  American courts and t h e  extraordinarily large 
settlements in recent years. 
The EIL system would benefit from be t t e r  organi- 
zation. Reinsurers a r e  too f a r  removed to  be directly 
involved in t h e  investigation and settlement of losses. 
Underwriters, loss adjusters, and risk engineers must 
work together more than they have in t h e  past. 
National and international reinsurance pools need to  be  
formed and techniques for handling claims and losses 
must improve in order  to  both satisfy t h e  victims and 
keep losses within acceptable proportions. 
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REEXAMINING COMPENSA TION 
A NEW LOOK AT STATISTICS 
Today, the cost of environmental damage appears to be 
prohibitively high to insure. In fact, the total financial 
burden of this damage is not a large proportion of the 
burden of all environmental accidents. 
Interesting figures appear when we look at disas- 
ters  that involve deaths, large-scale evacuation, or 
expensive cleanup (for instance, oil spills, tanker 
accidents, decontamination of hazardous-was t e  dumps, 
dam accidents, contamination of soil or water, air pollu- 
tion, noise, and radioactivity. With few exceptions, 
they have never caused third-party damage greater 
than that which has occurred in airline crashes, indus- 
trial fires, or explosions. Other forms of losses may 
well exceed this amount, so the premium for third-party 
liability coverage can be expected to be only a modest 
proportion of the total premium. 
A statistical "law" seems to be operative: the fre- 
quency of accidents diminishes in proportion to their 
severity, and the financial weight of technological 
disasters in different categories of severity stays 
roughly constant. (The law does not seem to apply to 
catastrophic natural disasters.) In particular, 
accidents causing losses greater than $20 million give 
rise t o  aggregate losses that  amount to  less than those 
of 25% of all accidents. Accordingly, insurance and 
compensation for such accidents is not, p r i m a  fac i e ,  
constrained by aggregate economic losses, nor do such 
accidents lie outside the  normal domain of insurability. 
The problems noted earlier with EIL insurance a r e  
even more striking when contrasted with these statis- 
tics. To date,  t h e  total cost has been a small fraction of 
t he  cost of preventive measures. Finally, t he  total cost 
of pollution disasters is much smaller than that  of 
natural disasters, a t  least in industrialized countries. 
Some form of compensation to  potential victims of pollu- 
tion damage, therefore,  is not an unreasonable aim. 
HOW COMPENSATION CAN BE STRUCTURED 
In order  t o  make sure  that  victims of serious pollution 
accidents a r e  compensated, insurance has been 
required for firms that  produce hazardous waste as by- 
products, compensat ion funds have been established. 
and parent companies have been made liable for their  
subsidiaries. These str ictures have created problems 
for firms that  a r e  too small to  self-insure and have 
found liability insurance too costly o r  impossible to  
purchase. Since no insurance system can cover t he  
very ra res t  and most costly events, compensation ceil- 
ings will be necessary, although they will be higher 
when the  risk is more widely spread. 
Some disasters - radioactivity, oil slicks, 
discharges of dangerous waste, a i r  pollution, and noise, 
for example - can cause catastrophic losses, so some 
governments have established special compensation 
systems to  protect  industries from going under and vic- 
tims from being poorly compensated. These a r e  
designed to  pay larger sums rapidly without attributing 
fault t o  any particular party.  The governments nor- 
mally levy a tax on firms to c rea te  these special funds 
and may have to  utilize revenue from other  sources t o  
cover losses above t h e  existing compensation ceilings. 
ASSESSING RISK ASSESS  M EN 7' 
THE LIMITATIONS 
Practitioners do not ful.ly understand scientific risk 
assessment and experts  disagree over both the  termi- 
nology and the  techniques used. The differences a r e  
less in t h e  models than in t h e  assumptions behind them 
and t h e  judgments made from them. For instance, a r e  
mice good subjects from which t o  draw inferences about 
human risk to  toxic substances? Even if t h e  answer is 
no, a r e  t h e  data derived from animal tes t s  valid enough 
to  help t h e  public make decisions? Uncertainty and 
subjectivity, however, need not imply chaos. W e  can 
always t r y  t o  bias results upward, so that  t he  "true" 
risk is unlikely to  exceed the  estimate w e  reach. 
People have difficulty assessing risk, partly 
because of difficulties in understanding past events and 
partly from fantasizing the  future. They tend to  
overestimate risks from sensational causes of death and 
underestimate those from nondramatic ones (partly 
because t h e  news media have the  same bias). Even accu- 
ra te  information can raise worries. Anxious people also 
tend t o  deny t h e  uncertainty - thus making t h e  risk so  
small that  i t  can be safely ignored o r  so large tha t  i t  
should clearly be avoided. 
People want facts,  not probabilities. They do not 
want to  face gambles, a form of denial tha t  accounts for 
the  polarized attitudes toward such hazards as nuclear 
power o r  pesticides. Polarized att i tudes a r e  harder  t o  
change, even with new disproving evidence; yet  those 
without strong opinions can easily be  swayed by t h e  
way information is presented. The potential for mani- 
pulation raises i ts  own ethical questions. 
THE PROSPECTS 
People can, nonetheless, be  educated about risks - if 
they and t h e  exper t s  share  an atmosphere of t rus t .  
Risks described quantitatively can be  shaped by 
t h e  way t h e  hazard category is defined, what conse- 
quences a r e  measured o r  reported,  and the  unit of 
observation. No statistical display can guarantee that  
a risk will be  understood, but comparisons between two 
figures have been shown to  be more meaningful than 
absolute numbers o r  probabilities. Comparisons can 
also ac t  as  guides to  decision making, although the  pub- 
lic needs o ther  information as well, such as  t h e  costs 
and benefits of t he  available options and the  degree of 
uncertainty in t h e  assessments. 
Communication problems extend beyond numbers. 
"Risk" may not mean the  same thing to  t h e  public as i t  
does to  t h e  exper t s ,  even when i t  is quantifiable and 
predictable. Lay people worry more about hazards, t h e  
adverse effects of which a r e  uncontrollable, dreaded, 
catastrophic, o r  fatal r a the r  than about risks that  a r e  
injurious, not offset by compensating benefits, and 
latent (i.e., future generations must bear them). They 
a r e  more concerned over a small accident in an unfa- 
miliar system (e.g., in a nuclear reactor o r  a 
recombinant-DNA laboratory) than a large one in a fa- 
miliar system (e.g., a train wreck). 
Consequently, these attr ibutes must be  considered 
along with probabilities and potential losses. Risk 
assessors must remember tha t  t h e  broader concerns 
reflected by the  public a r e  legitimate. In a sense, each 
hazard is unique, but in an attempt t o  understand t h e  
collective lay mind, multiattitude indices a r e  being com- 
piled and studied. 
Future research in risk assessment appears most 
promising. One aspect is informed consent, which per- 
mits people t o  make decisions in their  best interest .  
Current procedures of informed consent convey the  
probabilities of risk be t te r  than the  consequences: How 
can a deeper perspective about t h e  la t te r  be con- 
veyed? Perhaps victims of a problem (a disease, for 
instance) should inform the  public about i ts  physical 
and emotional impact. W e  know virtually nothing about 
how strong a tendency the re  is t o  deny t h e  relevance 
of a r isk o r  about t h e  nature of t h e  process of assimi- 
lating a message. 
Another area  of research is developing creative 
indices and analogies. W e  might study t h e  way people 
understand commonly used measures for distance, time, 
and speed, o r  how they react  t o  specific figures on a 
scale such as t h e  Richter scale, designed t o  measure 
earthquakes. Perceptions a r e  malleable, so  w e  must 
learn how people organize the  data. Does, for example, 
presenting information in more than one way help o r  
confuse t h e  listener? Since information cannot be 
presented neutrally, w e  must be aware of ethical and 
political implications of different modes of displaying 
data. W e  must remember t o  tes t  all messages, recogniz- 
ing tha t  they may be informative in different ways. 
Other research is required on how individuals 
characterize risk and how they differ in representing 
i t .  W e  also need to  know whether people can absorb 
information as  index summaries and whether they will 
make o r  accept decisions based on these. 
HELPING OUT THE MEDIA 
The media have been criticized for misleading the  pub- 
lic, not only by t h e  content of stories, but also by the  
massive attention bestowed upon some issues; quantity 
both shapes and defines issues. Stories rarely include 
"enabling information" that  tells readers o r  listeners 
where t o  obtain help o r  fur ther  details. 
In defense of t he  media, risk stories a r e  
inherently complex and journalists must depend on 
experts  in many fields. Scientists can help them by 
discussing their  findings with them, providing as com- 
plete and unbiased information as possible, and 
developing clearinghouses for scientific news. 
Research should study the  theory of media - why, 
for instance, is disorder prime news (one reason is that  
it threatens values) - or issues that  serious journalists 
may find useful - for instance, systematic biases or  
inadequacies in stories where t h e  experts  disagree. 
THE DYNAMICS OF CRISES 
WHEN STRUCTURES FALL APART 
A crisis can be likened to an unfurling wave because it 
is not an ordered series of decomposable difficulties, 
but a complete breakdown - technical, organizational, 
and psychological. Existing policies and programs no 
longer work because they are designed to cope with 
normal situations rather than unexpected ones. 
Organizationally, a crisis turns sequences into 
rapid chain reactions. Underlying antagonisms surface 
when a number of contradictory requirements must be 
met at once. People look for the technical miracle - or 
undertake witch hunts in search of scapegoats. This 
disorder feeds on itself, so corrective mechanisms 
cease to work. Potential sources of help retreat, view- 
ing the crisis as a threat to themselves. Teams disin- 
tegrate, leaving individuals to face problems on their 
own: communication falters, trust evaporates. A crisis 
exposes vulnerable points in the overall sociopolitical 
fabric. 
RIGHTING THE WORLD 
One can, however, cope with a crisis. Much of the 
response is tactical: speed is essential. Basic 
arrangements must converge - trained teams of special- 
is t s  knowledgeable about the  hazards of industrial 
products, communications and advice centers (for 
instance, t he  chemical industry's CHEMTREC), on-site 
emergency plans (established in advance), off-site 
emergency plans, and intraindustry systems of mutual 
aid. Emergency plans of firms must be coordinated with 
those of local authorities. Employees in firms and the  
general public must be kept informed of new programs 
and policies designed to  deal with a crisis. 
Organizations, whose morale and stability a r e  
based on the  premise that  the  exceptional will not 
occur, must not, in a crisis, withdraw from the  many 
public demands placed on them. They will be inclined 
t o  say that  "everything is under control," but the  pub- 
lic will believe just t he  opposite. 
Community leaders should have already studied 
o ther  major crises in order t o  understand how to  cope 
with t h e  reality of t he  current situation. They must 
efficiently manage information and mobilize analysts , 
decision makers, and other  individuals who may not 
have worked together before. They must also provide 
correct ,  consistent, and up-to-date information to  the  
media; silence may imply guilt, justifiably or  not. 
Top management will be sucked into the  crisis as 
well. I t  must be prepared to  gather information con- 
tinuously and interpret  and reinterpret  i t ,  but there  is 
little margin for e r ror ,  especially as regards the  media. 
Top management must maintain internal coherence and 
capability, even though the destructive tendency of 
crises pulls t he  o ther  way, creating doubts about the 
mission, weakening allegiances, fomenting separateness 
in teams. 
The crucial element for management is safety. 
Hazards and points of vulnerability must be  anticipated 
- for instance, those involving new products, new tech- 
nologies, new organizational forms, and new business 
strategies. Many institutional arrangements and poli- 
cies will have to  be reexamined in light of the  current 
crisis - compensation for victims, the  possibility of 
failure of networks, such as the  telephone service, or  
proposed economic solutions that  might shortchange 
safety a t  a time when the public is demanding greater 
safety. I t  has been unusual for management to  have 
implemented prevention programs or  t o  have made 
safety goals public prior to the  crisis, efforts that  
would gain it credibility and legitimacy. During a crisis, 
safety concerns must not be overshadowed by techni- 
cal, economic, or  administrative considerat ions. 
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THE PROBLEM OF EQUITY 
IN CHOOSING SITES 
THECOSTSOFCARELESSNESS 
Programs for  t h e  disposal of hazardous waste a r e  
behind schedule and in disarray today. Plans for win- 
ning public acceptance of selected si tes have generally 
failed and have sometimes been turned down in volatile 
anger. Regional compacts have led t o  balkanization. 
One problem is tha t  plans for siting a waste- 
disposal facility typically a r e  undertaken in isolation 
r a the r  than as par t  of t he  overall "cradle-to-grave" 
concept, which begins when the  waste is generated and 
then transported t o  t h e  place where i t  is s tored o r  oth- 
erwise disposed of. Another problem is uncertainty 
about t h e  likelihood of massive human contamination, a 
concern tha t  can push t h e  public close t o  hysteria. 
The public also remembers past disasters, such as Love 
Canal, and is unlikely to  be soothed merely by more 
complete and accurate information on t h e  new technol- 
ogy than has been presented previously. Controversies 
mix factual disagreements and value disputes. 
Much of t he  opposition t o  waste facilities comes 
from local residents who perceive an injustice, feeling 
tha t  industry and t h e  public a t  large may benefit while 
they  bear  all t h e  risks. Studies of equity a r e  few; both 
theory and experience a r e  lacking. I t  may be possible 
t o  share  t he  benefits of a disposal facility by t he  same 
type of arrangement tha t  taxes t h e  winners and pro- 
vides compensation t o  t he  chosen si te.  I t  may be possi- 
ble t o  reduce risks by enforcing specific standards and 
regulations regarding health and safety. Ethical ques- 
tions also arise: When and for  what ends may risks be 
placed upon others? Who should make such decisions? 
What rights do risk bearers have? 
The problem of dealing with these  siting issues is 
compounded because t he  public distrusts institutions, 
including governments, part ly because toxic wastes 
have been badly mismanaged for decades and proper 
disposal has been neglected. Even good intentions 
sometimes go awry. The public can be shown a "fault 
tree" tha t  is designed to  demonstrate how small t h e  
risks a r e ,  yet this leaves t he  opposite impression by 
revealing how many things could go wrong. 
Finally, t he  responsibilities for selecting sites 
differ depending on t h e  type of waste involved. In t h e  
US, s ta tes  have t h e  responsibility for choosing t h e  
many si tes needed for toxic but nonradioactive waste; 
regions for  low-level radioactive waste; and t h e  Federal 
Government for  high-level waste. There is no coordina- 
tion between efforts a t  different governmental levels, 
although t h e  problems a r e  the  same in each group. The 
result is tha t  f e w  sites for disposal of toxic waste have 
been selected and developed. 
SEEKING CREATIVE IDEAS 
There a r e  several models t o  establish a si te:  
(1) In a market-based model, risks a r e  frequently 
borne by poor communities who a r e  least able t o  
pay large sums t o  avoid having t h e  facility in the i r  
backyard. 
(2)  The model in which a central  authority imposes a 
s i te  appears t o  be oriented toward protecting 
health and safety. Such authorities, however, 
command little t rus t  and confidence and do not 
serve to  quiet the fears of the public. In fact ,  
opposition to  their  decisions usually escalates. 
(3) In the  "bartered consent" model, residents near 
the  chosen site receive compensation as part  of a 
negotiated agreement . This approach presumably 
converts local opposition into neutral if not posi- 
tive feelings, helps restore equity, and promotes 
shared values with respect t,o the facility. It is 
the  heart  of the  US Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982 - a series of carrots coupled with the 
Presidential stick of forced selection if a volun- 
t a ry  agreement is not forthcoming. It assumes 
that ,  in choosing between sites,  benefits can be 
weighed against risks, tha t  compensation can be 
determined by specifying the  long-term impact of 
the  facility, and that t he  developer and the regu- 
latory agency can gain social t rust .  Today, these 
assumptions a re  questionable. 
(4) The "fairness-centered'' model may include 
mechanisms for conflict resolution. For instance, 
it might allow for a "siting jury" tha t  always con- 
sists of different interested parties, including 
residents of the  areas under consideration. Alter- 
natively, i t  might select an ad hoc commission to  
determine the  location of the  facility from a list of 
certified sites. O r  a lottery might be utilized. 
Such approaches have not been widely discussed 
to  date,  but given the  failures of existing institu- 
tions, these new approaches may be worth trying. 
In addition to  conceptualizing the siting problem as a 
systems-level task, a new paradigm must have an ethical 
basis. It must recognize that  some individuals will have 
t o  bear risks for others, but t he  imposition on these 
should be voluntary if possible; that  risks should be 
avoided, wherever cost-effective; and tha t  unavoidable 
risks must be compensated through sharing the  
winners' gains with the  potential losers. 
IMPLEMENTING THE RISK- MANAGEMENT 
TOOLS OF INSURANCE, COMPENSATION, 
AND REGULA TION 
THE PROBLEM 
Balancing t h e  benefits and costs associated with haz- 
ardous materials is difficult. A mix of regulatory and 
market forces ought t o  assure a viable and safe infra- 
s t ructure  for t he  transport and use of these materials. 
However, w e  need t o  know how different interested 
parties weigh and evaluate t h e  various consequences of 
regulatory and policy options. Can insurance and com- 
pensation sufficiently redress t h e  balance with respect 
t o  risks, costs, and benefits in t he  management of 
hazardous waste? 
A MODEL FOR SITING 
The quest ion bears initially on t h e  economic, environ- 
mental, and health effects of t h e  transportation, treat-  
ment, and disposal of hazardous waste. Insurance, lia- 
bility, and safety measures a r e  joint, ra ther  than 
separate,  issues. A generator o r  a transporter of waste 
accepts risks according t o  t h e  anticipated liability and 
compensation arrangements. For example, if t h e  
private cost to  a profit-oriented firm is lower than the  
social cost of an accident, t h e  implication i s  that  t he  
level of ca re  taken by the  firm will be  insufficient. The 
incentive to  make investments in safety is greater  if a 
firm can thereby reduce i ts  liability. On t h e  o ther  
hand, if firms perceive tha t  the i r  reputations a r e  a t  
s take  if the i r  activities adversely affect  human health 
and safety,  they  may spend more on waste reduction 
than is socially optimal. 
There a r e  fu r ther  complexities in designing 
optimal strategies for  managing hazardous materials. A 
firm faces trade-offs between enhancing i ts  output and 
taking protective measures, since i ts  own resources a r e  
finite. Furthermore, not all damages can be expressed 
in monetary t e r m s ,  particularly environmental and 
health effects for  which t h e r e  a r e  often no easily 
assignable causal agents. In fact ,  t h e  uncertainties 
associated with non-sudden "accidents" make i t  virtu- 
ally impossible t o  assemble a predictive data base for  
assessing risks. Under t h e  "polluter pays" principle, 
many victims would not be  compensated by firms tha t  
have only limited assets. On t h e  o ther  hand, under t h e  
"public pays" principle, firms have limited incentive t o  
undertake protective measures. An appropriate deci- 
sion regarding an acceptable level of risk requires a 
balance between enforcement costs, incentives, and t h e  
inequity of leaving some victims uncompensated. 
Compensation and insurance can help choose a 
feasible and appropriate si te,  but who is to  participate 
in t h e  negotiations process? Several part ies can be  
identified as integral: 
The firms tha t  generate t h e  waste (they want t o  
continue producing their  goods; t hey  a r e  also par- 
tially liable, according t o  US law, for  t h e  costs of 
accidents). 
The facility developers, who have a financial 
incentive t o  compensate t h e  host community, 
perhaps through taxes (they should also be  
prepared for  liability claims). 
The host community, t o  whom t h e  gains a r e  limited 
and t h e  costs possibly large. 
(4) The insurance companies, which face the  uncer- 
taint ies inherent in accidents a t  hazardous-was t e  
facilities and in court settlements. 
(5) Other residents outside t h e  area of the  facility 
who benefit from the  goods and services produced 
by the  firm that  generates the  hazardous waste. 
SUBSEQUENT STAGES 
In building the  facility, the  developer will probably 
have to  offer t he  community e i ther  monetary compensa- 
tion or  payment in kind. If compensation is interpreted 
as a bribe, then the  t e r m  "benefit sharing" may be 
more palatable. In living with t he  facility, residents 
will worry about property values and economic develop- 
ment. Developers might not know what t o  offer because 
fair market values a r e  difficult t o  determine in the  
absence of a facility. If premiums a r e  based on risk, 
insurance might encourage firms to  invest in be t te r  
plant design and other  protective measures; arrange- 
ments can also be made to  monitor and control plants. 
Accidents involving hazardous wastes must be anti- 
cipated. A long latency period before health conse- 
quences reveal themselves make traditional insurance 
arrangements inadequate. Private and public sectors 
may have to  combine to  form insurance programs, mak- 
ing use of claims-made policies, t rus t  funds, and an 
industry-wide self-insurance fund. (The la t ter  sor t  of 
fund may have one major administrative problem - moni- 
toring, t o  make sure  tha t  participants, secure in t he  
knowledge tha t  they a r e  insured, do not exhibit care- 
lessness .) 
Not all of t h e  stakeholders have an equal interest  
a t  each stage of development. The public has been 
shown to  be  disturbed most by t h e  dread and unknow- 
ability of hazardous-waste risks. Compensation, or  
benefit sharing, will likely have t o  be relatively high 
when both of these factors characterize t he  risk of a 
proposed technology. There may be  justifiable differ- 
ences of opinion: t h e  industry and the  developer may 
know the  technology well and feel tha t  i t  carries a 
minimal risk, while the public, not knowing this, may 
feel otherwise. 
The probability of accidents will be  difficult t o  
assess. Some accidents, in fact ,  a r e  so unlikely tha t  
there  will be no practical basis for statistically 
estimating their  chances of occurring. Insurers will not 
be interested in selling coverage because of t he  uncer- 
tainty. On the  o ther  hand, t h e  potential host community 
may imagine the  losses graphically - and consequently 
overestimate the  potential losses r a the r  than focus on 
their  relatively low probability of occurrence. 
The t r u e  willingness of an individual o r  community 
to  accept a facility that  might harm them but benefit 
others is not easily measured. Considerations of equity 
and fairness complicate the  matter, as do institutional 
arrangements for designing appropriate mechanisms for 
compensation. In general, insurance policies and com- 
pensation cannot stand by themselves; they must  be  
integrated into a broader framework. A f t e r  sites have 
been selected for their  economic and environmental 
suitability, t h e  values of each interested par ty  m u s t  be 
determined. A "value t ree"  analysis might be  helpful in 
this process. I t  often reveals conflicts among the  
stakeholders and lay out possible benefit- and risk- 
sharing options. The government's role as a monitor 
can also be  spelled out. 
Four cri teria a r e  useful for siting a hazardous 
materials facility: 
(1) The siting process should be open, allowing public 
participation in the  final decision. 
(2) Deadlines a r e  necessary to  prevent foot-dragging. 
(3) Siting arrangements must be  specified and the  
expected gains and losses clearly delineated. 
(4) Insurance, compensation, and regulatory mechan- 
isms should be  considered, recognizing that  they 
will have different uses under alternative mea- 
sures of societal welfare. 
Overlapping jurisdictions c rea te  fur ther  complica- 
tions - for instance, classification of wastes, document- 
ing and report  ing flows across borders, agreement on 
financial responsibility and liability, development of 
t h e  inf ras t ructure ,  and assurance t h a t  t h e  facility has 
sufficient demand. 
Much remains t o  be  learned: How do firms respond 
t o  t h e  policy tools of insurance, compensation through 
negotiation, and regulation? How can t h e  stigma of com- 
pensation b e  overcome? W e  lack empirical validation of 
theories of bargaining and collective-choice procedures 
with respec t  t o  managing hazardous materials. Insurers 
need creat ive policies t o  grapple with t h e  uncertainties 
associated with t h e  probability of accidents  and t h e  
ensuing consequences. If private insurers cannot pro- 
vide coverage, industry-wide self-insurance programs 
should b e  considered. Finally, t h e  cour ts  and t h e  
government must learn t o  apprecia te  t h e i r  r e s p e ~ t i v e  
roles in t h e  process of managing hazardous materials. 
T H E  CONFERENCE' PROCEEDINGS 
The Conference Proceedings will be published in book 
form under the title I n s u r i n g  a n d  Managing  Hazard- 
o u s  Risks:  From Seveso  to  Bhopal a n d  Beyond ,  edited 
by Paul Kleindorfer and Howard Kunreuther. 
The book is divided into four parts. Part One pro- 
vides perspectives on the nature and magnitude of 
accidents and losses from previous technological disas- 
ters,  notably Seveso and Bhopal. Aspects considered 
are  the reactions of organizations and public authori- 
ties t,o crisis situations, errors in technical design 
and/or management, problems of public health and eva- 
cuation, and the extent of environmental damage and its 
insurability. 
Part Two deals with the relationships between 
production, transportation, handling, storing, and 
disposal of hazardous materials and the policy ins t ru- 
ments of insurance, compensation, regulation, and nego- 
tiation. In particular, it examines the use of insurance 
and compensation to share regional benefits from a 
hazardous-waste facility with those at  risk from the 
facility: the importance and difficulties of negotiations 
t o  spread risks and benefits, and t o  gain informed con- 
sensus; and the  problems of winning and maintaining 
public t rust  in t he  resolution of these conflicts. 
Part  Three discusses t h e  traditional problems of 
hazard identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation, 
and related perception and communication problems. In 
particular, i t  explores in detail t he  complex relation- 
ships bet  ween chemical risk analysis and management ; 
t h e  practical use and promise, as well as pitfalls, of 
risk analysis for insurers and industry; t h e  problems of 
communicating efficiently with the public and under- 
standing their  anxieties; and the  use of value tree 
analysis t o  assess t he  stakes held by various parties in 
policies that  affect t he  risks associated with hazardous 
materials. 
Part Four focuses on appropriate policy instru- 
ments for mitigating risks, reducing o r  eliminating 
risks, spreading risks, and absorbing the  financial and 
o ther  loss potential of risks in socially and financially 
acceptable ways. In particular, chapters  compare 
regulatory styles for  hazardous waste management in 
various countries; the  legal background of liability 
insurance and i ts  effectiveness in preventing risk o r  
satisfying the  public; and the  prospects of environmen- 
tal impairment liability (EIL), in terms of land-based 
incidents and transportation of hazardous wastes by 
sea,  and institutional reasons for t h e  decline of EIL. 
The book also contains commentaries on some of 
t he  chapters  t o  reflect t he  often very active 
exchanges between Conference participants on various 
topics. Finally, since a major objective of t h e  Confer- 
ence was to  plan a research agenda for t h e  next 
decade, w e  summarize in the  Epilogue t h e  recommenda- 
tions produced a t  t h e  concluding plenary session. 
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